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TOPICAL SURVEY

III. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW
ADMIRALTY - MARITIME ATTACHMENT - PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN SUPPLEMENTAL ADMIRALTY RULE B(1) DO NOT COMPLY WITH MINIMUM
STANDARDS OF DUE PROCESS AS CURRENTLY
DEFINED IN THE UNITED STATES
Grand Bahama Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Canadian Transportation
Agencies, Ltd. 450 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
Grand Bahama Petroleum Co., Ltd.,' a Bahamian corporation,
maintains a fueling facility in Freeport, Grand Bahama Island. In early
July, 1977,2 the Soviet flag vessel M/V KUIBSHEVGES, allegedly under
charter to Canadian Transportation Agencies, Ltd., 3 called to take on
bunkers. On July 6, Grand Bahama Petroleum supplied the vessel with
2,296 barrels of fuel and charged the defendants $40,363.48 (plus barge
fees of $600). Canadian Transport failed to pay the amount due or any
part thereof. On August 3, 1977, Grand Bahama Petroleum instituted an
in personam action, in admiralty, against the defendant in U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Washington. The sole connection
between the forum and the cause of action was a bank account of
$8,851.38 maintained in a Washington bank in the name of Pacific
Seatrains Co., but allegedly the property of all the defendants. Grand
Bahama Petroleum attached the bank account pursuant to Supplemental
Admiralty Rule B(1). 4 On November 28, 1977, the defendants filed a
motion to dismiss on two grounds: first, that maritime attachment
violated the principles of procedural due process set forth in Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp. of Bay View 5 and, second, that the court lacked
jurisdiction under the standards set forth in Shaffer v. Heitner.6 The court
granted defendant's motion and held that the procedure prescribed in
7
Rule B(1) is violative of due process.

1. Hereinafter referred to as Grand Bahama Petroleum.
2. All dates relating to the instant action are 1977.
3. Hereinafter referred to as Canadian Transport.
4. FED. R. Civ. P., Supplemental Rule B(1) for Certain Admiralty and
Maritime Claims.
5. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
6. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
7. The action was not appealed.
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In Shaffer, the plaintiff brought a stockholder's derivative suit in
Delaware Chancery Court against twenty-eight present and former
employees of Greyhound, none of whom was a resident of Delaware. The
suit was based on unrelated acts allegedly committed in Oregon. The only
connection between the defendants and the forum was stock ownership as
evidenced by the corporate stock ledger at Greyhound's corporate
headquarters in Delaware.
The Shaffer Court viewed the assertion of jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant, merely because his property happened to be
present in the forum state, as nothing more than a fiction allowing the
state to indirectly obtain personal jurisdiction where it otherwise could
not:
[T]he phrase, 'judicial jurisdiction over a thing,' is the customary
elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons
in a thing (citation omitted). This recognition leads to the conclusion
that in order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for
jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising jurisdiction over
the interests of persons in a thing. 8
The Court decided the "sufficient" basis should be the minimum contacts
standard established in InternationalShoe Co. v. State of Washington.9
Consequently, the Shaffer Court denied Delaware jurisdiction to the
plaintiffs.
In GrandBahama, the court acknowledged the similarity between the
facts before it and those in Shaffer. In both cases a plaintiff sought to
compel the personal appearance of a nonresident defendant to answer
and defend a suit brought against him by seizing property found within
the forum's jurisdiction. The only difference between the two existed in
the fact that the Grand Bahama action was brought in admiralty.
The law of admiralty has evolved to deal with one specific activity:
the carriage of goods and passengers by water. While its exact origins are
unknown, it is believed to be one of the oldest legal systems in the world. 10
8. 433 U.S. at 207.
9. Id., International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
established the following test: "[Ifn order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" 326 U.S. at 316.
10. Admiralty has traditionally been traced back to the Rhodian Sea Laws
which are dated from 900 B.C. The basic elements of the maritime law system of
general average are found in Justinian's Digest which, in turn, cites the Rhodian
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The ability of a plaintiff to bring an action against the property of a
defendant, whether it be an in rem action, or, an in personam action
through attachment, is a keystone of admiralty jurisprudence. Persons
engaged in maritime commerce traditionally lead a very transmigratory
life. Forcing claimants to bring suit in the domicile of the defendant (and
disallowing them from suing in any forum where the defendant might be
found, or his property attached) could result in great delay, inconvenience, and, in many cases, a denial of justice." Admiralty, with its link to
a single industry, its separate history, and its long continued and
internationally recognized traditions, concepts, and legal practices,
12
distinctively stands apart from shoreside law.
In the United States, admiralty has always been recognized as an
autonomous body of law. Constitutional, legislative, and judicial
provisions have been made to allow its unique practices to continue. 13 In
Manro v. Alemida,' 4 the Supreme Court dealt with the question of
whether maritime attachment was a part of American admiralty
jurisprudence. In that case, the process of attachment was issued by the
clerk of the court rather than by court order. Instead of moving to quash
it for irregularity of process, the respondent appeared to the libel and filed
a demurrer. The demurrer was granted by the district court and the circuit
court affirmed. The Supreme Court limited its inquiry to "whether the
court below erred in refusing to the libellant the process of attachment on
the case made out in his libel."' 5 The Court found that maritime
attachment was a part of American admiralty jurisprudence and, hence,
was available to the libellant. It further held that the libel should not
have been dismissed since it substantially satisfied the pleading and
procedural requirements of the time.' 6 Maritime attachment has remained

Sea Laws as authority. See G. GiumoaR & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 3
(1957).
11. In re the Louisville Underwriters, 134 U.S. 488, 493 (1890); The Propeller
Commerce, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 574, 580-81 (1862).
12. The concepts of limitation of liability, the maritime lien, the in rem
proceeding and the principles of salvage have no counterpart in traditional
common law.
13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976) (corresponds to the
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §9, 1 Stat. 76-77); The Romero, 358 U.S. 354, 368
(1959).
14. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 473 (1825).
15. Id. at 485.
16. Id. at 495-96. Interestingly enough, judicial participation was required for
obtaining a writ of maritime attachment in 1844 under Admiralty Rule 2. See Md.
Tuna Corp. v. M/S BENARES, 429 F.2d 307, 320 (2d Cir. 1970).
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a part of American admiralty jurisprudence ever since. 17 Indeed, the
Maritime Lien Act of 197118 tends to strengthen traditional admiralty
remedies against property. On the basis of admiralty's autonomy and the
longstanding existence of a specific type of maritime attachment, the
Grand Bahama court concluded that the requirements set out in Shaffer
did not apply to Rule B(1). 19
SNIADACH V. FAMILY FINANCE CORP. OF BAY VIEW

The defendant also challenged the constitutionality of the procedure
used under Rule B(1) on the grounds that it violated the safeguards
required by Sniadach v.Family Finance Corp. and its progeny. 20 The
plaintiff relied most heavily on North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. DiChem.21 As with Grand Bahama, that case involved a corporate plaintiff
who garnished the bank account of a corporate defendant. The
garnishment procedures used in the two cases were almost identical: the
writ of garnishment was issuable on an affidavit of the plaintiff or his
attorney and the affidavit need only contain conclusory allegations. In
both cases, the writ was issuable by the court clerk without judicial
participation, and there was no provision for an immediate post-seizure
hearing. The only distinguishing characteristic between Di-Chem and
Grand Bahama was that the latter was an action in admiralty. The court
in Grand Bahama found this distinction unpersuasive and held that the
procedures of Rule B(1) were violative of procedural due process. The
opinion stated that the court could "find no indication that maritime
defendants may be due less procedural protection against mistaken
'22
deprivation of property than non-maritime defendants.

17. A procedure for maritime attachment has been provided for in the
admiralty rules since they were first promulgated in 1844. See 7A MooRE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE paras. 21(1), at 201 and .30 at 224 (2d. ed. 1978); FED. R. Civ.
P., Supplemental Admiralty Rule B(1).
18. 46 U.S.C. § 973 (1976), construed in Lake Union Drydock Co. v. M/V
POLAR VIKING, 446 F. Supp. 1286 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
19. 450 F. Supp. at 456.
20. Three previous cases have raised this argument: Techem Chemical Co.,
Ltd. v. M/T CHOYO MARU, 416 F. Supp. 960 (D. Md. 1976); Amstar Corp. v. M/V
ALEXANDROS T, 431 F. Supp. 328 (D. Md. 1977); Central Soya Co., Inc. v. Cox
Towing Corp., 417 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. Miss. 1976). In all of these cases the court
held that the respondent had not, in fact, been denied due process under the district
court rules and, therefore, never reached the constitutional question presented here.
21. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
22. 450 F. Supp. at 459.
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CONCLUSION

Allowing Rule B(1) maritime attachment to escape the minimum
contacts standard of Shaffer could encourage forum shopping. A plaintiff
who cannot establish the minimum contacts necessary to gain jurisdiction of a state court may be able to bring the action in federal court if he
can establish admiralty jurisdiction. On the other hand, if Shaffer were to
apply to maritime attachment, many claimants would effectively be
foreclosed from bringing an action and thereby denied an opportunity to
obtain relief. On balance it seems that the historical basis, the unique
subject matter, and the specialized remedies of admiralty provide
sufficient reasons to allow actions in admiralty to escape the limitations
23
of Shaffer.
There seems, however, no reason not to apply the procedural
safeguards created by the Sniadach line of cases. The precise status of
such safeguards is uncertain. 24 Admiralty decisions may be able to
deviate somewhat from the strictest requirements created by the
Sniadach line of cases without acting contrary to the Supreme Court's
intention. However, the shortcomings of Rule B(1) specifically, and of
admiralty law generally with respect to procedural due process have been
seriously criticized. 25 It appears that, as this case indicates, at least some

23. Grand Bahama specifically applies only to in personam proceedings. 450
F. Supp. at 460 n. 85. See also, Bohman, Applicability of Shaffer to Admiralty In
Rem Jurisdiction,53 TUL. L. REv. 135 (1978), in which Ms. Bohman suggests that
the "minimum contacts" required by Shaffer are not those traditionally used -

namely contacts with the state in which the federal district court is located - but
contacts with the United States as an entity because admiralty disputes fall
primarily within the purview of federal jurisdiction.
24. As evidence of the Supreme Court's current reevaluation of this area, see

Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) and North Georgia Finishing, Inc.
v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
25. Note, MaritimeAttachment Under Rule B: A JurisdictionalDisguise for an
UnconstitutionalSecurity Attachment, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 403 (1977).
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improvement is necessary. In fact specific changes have already been
proposed within the maritime industry, 26 and should now be actively
pursued.
Charles A. Meade

26. This problem is avoided in the draft proposals of the AMERICAN

MARITIME

ASSOCIATION, PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SUPPLEMENTAL RULES, REPORT OF THE

COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

6783-84 (M.L.A. Doc. No. 610, Nov. 1,

1977) which reads as follows:

Summary Release from arrest or attachment.
Where property is arrested or attached, any person claiming an
interest in the property arrested or attached may, upon a showing of any
improper practice or a manifest want of equity on the part of the plaintiff,
be entitled to an order requiring the plaintiff to show cause forthwith why
the arrest or attachment should not be vacated or other relief granted
consistent with these rules.
Cf. Local Admiralty Rule 13 of the Southern and Eastern District of New York,
reprinted in 5 Benedict on Admiralty 644-45 (7th ed. A. Knauth & C. Knauth 1974)
which states:
Where property is arrested, any person claiming an interest in the property
arrested, may, upon evidence showing any improper practice or a manifest
want of equity on the part of the plaintiff be entitled to an order requiring
the plaintiff to show cause instanter why the arrest or attachment should
not be vacated.

